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Dynamic self-determinism, the right to belief and the role of collective worship 
Frankie McCarthy 
 
Abstract 
The practice of collective worship remains mandatory in state schools throughout the UK. 
What justification exists for this practice? This paper employs Eekelaar’s ‘dynamic self-
determinism’ model to explore the connection between collective worship and the child’s 
human right to belief.  
 
The paper first extrapolates the basic, developmental and autonomy interests protected within 
the right to belief as encapsulated within the tapestry of international legal instruments. It 
argues that school worship could serve the child’s interest in development of the capacity for 
spiritual and philosophical thought. However, the absence of clear policy on the type of 
capacity schools seek to develop prevents worship from fulfilling this role effectively. It also 
argues that the child’s autonomy interest demands that ‘mature minors’ have the choice to ‘opt-
out’ of worship on conscience grounds. 
 
The paper concludes with recommendations for reform of school collective worship to ensure 
compliance with the UK’s international rights obligations. 
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What is the purpose of collective worship in UK schools? The practice of collective 
worship, most commonly taking the form of participation in assemblies where hymns are sung 
and passages from religious texts discussed, remains mandatory in state schools throughout the 
United Kingdom. In most areas, statute provides that worship must be ‘wholly or mainly of a 
broadly Christian character’. Today the rationale and justification for ‘the practice of collective 
worship’ (a phrase originally taken from the Education Reform Act 1988, ss. 6-7, which applied 
to England and Wales) is less than clear. Teaching is no longer the province primarily of the 
clergy, and members of the Christian church no longer form the majority of the UK population. 
Despite this, collective worship retains its place, and parents and governments continue to 
express support for its inclusion. What justification can be found for this practice in a 
religiously plural society? 
In this chapter, I argue that collective worship can contribute to the fulfilment of the 
child's right to belief, by developing her capacity for religious or philosophical thought. The 
right to belief is analysed through the lens of John Eekelaar's model of dynamic self-
determinism. Eekelaar, a former director of the University of Oxford Centre for Family Law 
and Policy, proposed a normative framework in which children’s rights are understood as a 
means of protecting and promoting a child's basic, developmental and autonomy interests 
(Eekelaar, 1986). These interests should be ordered as a hierarchy, so that the autonomy interest 
need only be satisfied where it does not conflict with the child's basic or developmental needs 
(Eekelaar, 1994). Adopting this framework in relation to the child’s right to belief allows me 
identify the interests collective worship might serve, the methods by which it might do so, and 
the extent to which current law and practice meet these ambitions.  
The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, I outline the dynamic self-
determinism model. Eekelaar developed this model in response to two ostensibly conflicting 
theories of human rights, combining elements of both to produce a theory which gives 
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recognition to the evolution of capacity over the course of childhood. In the second part, I use 
the dynamic self-determinism model to unpick the interests comprised within the child’s right 
to belief. In the third part, I make some suggestions as to the role school collective worship 
might play in protecting or promoting these interests, and explore whether, as currently 
practised, collective worship does play that role. In closing, I make three principal 
recommendations for reform of collective worship applicable in each country in the UK: first, 
that the government of each sets out a clear policy statement as to the type of capacity for belief 
that the school system intends to develop; second, that schools adopt a practice of worship that 
develops that capacity in line with international human rights obligations, which is likely to 
require a secular approach in non-faith schools; and thirdly, that the autonomy interest of 
mature minors be respected through the ability to opt-out of worship which conflicts with their 
beliefs or values.   
The term collective worship is used throughout the United Kingdom other than in 
Scotland, where the term religious observance is preferred. In this chapter, for the sake of 
brevity, the term collective worship will be used to mean the practice in all four countries. 
Where specific jurisdictional practices are relevant, this will be made clear in the text and the 
correct terminology will be used. 
 
Children's rights and dynamic self-determinism 
 
Eekelaar's model of children’s rights, which he termed ‘dynamic self-determinism’, 
arose from a larger debate about the normative underpinning of human rights in general 
(Choudhry and Herring, 2010, 97-139). The discussion focused on two competing justifications 
for human rights. Will theorists focused on autonomy, asserting that the purpose of human 
rights was to protect the choices made by an individual in respect of her own life. Interest 
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theorists, by contrast, focused on welfare, arguing that rights existed to protect the interests of 
the holders by placing duties on others to respect those interests.  
The position of children became central to this debate following Neil McCormick’s 
argument to the effect that children, as non-autonomous actors, are incapable of making choices 
in most spheres of life. Accordingly, in his view, if the will theory of rights were correct, 
children would not be able to benefit from human rights protection. Interest theory should 
therefore be preferred, since children undoubtedly have interests that merit protection. 
Although a child would be unable to enforce the duties placed on others in recognition of her 
interests, enforcement could be carried out on her behalf by another person, such as a parent 
(MacCormick, 1976).  
A central critique of interest theory, which carries particular weight where children are 
concerned, relates to how the protected interests are identified. Who has the right to decide? 
This was of concern to Eekelaar, who warned:  
 
Powerful social actors could proclaim what they deem to be in the interests of others, 
establish institutional mechanisms for promoting or protecting those interests, and 
claim to be protecting the rights of others, whether or not the others approved or even 
knew their interests were being constructed in that way. (Eekelaar, 2007, 336)    
 
With this concern in mind, Eekelaar set out to develop a model that incorporated aspects 
of both potential normative underpinnings of children's rights. Key to this model was his 
proposition that supporting children to develop the capacity for autonomous decision-making 
is, in itself, an interest deserving of protection. Eekelaar (1986, 169) started from the premise 
that, if rights are intended to protect interests, they must only protect ‘the interests that the 
subject might plausibly claim in themselves’. He identified three categories of interest that a 
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child might claim. In the first place, a child would seek protection of her basic interests, 
meaning general physical, emotional and intellectual care within the social capabilities of her 
caregivers (Eekelaar, 1986, 170). This would include such things as food, shelter and clothing 
along with love and nurturing. The primary provider in respect of basic interests would likely 
be the child’s parents or guardians. In the second place, the child would seek protection of her 
developmental interests, which are defined as the opportunity to have her capabilities 
developed to their best advantage within the constraints imposed by the economic and social 
structure of society (Eekelaar, 1986, 170). This would include chiefly the provision of 
education and training, and as such these interests would be fulfilled by the state or society as 
a whole in conjunction with the child’s parents. Lastly, the child would claim protection of her 
autonomy interest, meaning the freedom to choose her own lifestyle and to enter social relations 
according to her own inclinations uncontrolled by the authority of the adult world, whether 
parents or institutions (Eekelaar, 1986, 171). 
The potential for these interests to conflict is obvious. An infant child may refuse to 
wear warm clothes when going outside in winter. To support the child’s autonomy interest in 
choosing her own clothes here would likely harm her basic interest in physical health. Eekelaar 
recognised this potential for conflict, and proposed that it be resolved by ordering the three 
categories of interests in a hierarchy: 
 
The problem is that a child’s autonomy interest may conflict with the developmental 
interest and even the basic interest. While it is possible that some adults retrospectively 
approve that they were, when children, allowed the exercise of their autonomy at the 
price of putting them at a disadvantage as against other children in realizing their life-
chances in adulthood, it seems improbable that this would be a common view. We may 
therefore rank the autonomy interest subordinate to the basic and developmental 
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interests. However, where they may be exercised without threatening these two interests, 
the claim for their satisfaction must be high. (Eekelaar, 1986, 171).  
 
If we accept that the development of autonomy forms part of a child’s interests, albeit 
a part that, at times, must be subordinated to more fundamental interests, what effect should 
that have on the treatment of children within the law? Eekelaar’s view was that legal 
assessments of the best interests of the child did not do enough to take into account the 
development of childhood autonomy. He proposed that a dynamic self-determinism model be 
adopted by decision-makers to ensure that all three categories of interest were appropriately 
recognised in their decisions (Eekelaar, 1994). Within this model, the goal of the decision is to 
ensure that the child is placed in an environment that is reasonably secure, but which exposes 
her to a wide range of interests (Eekelaar, 1994, 47-48). As she develops, the child would be 
encouraged to draw on these influences in such a way that she contributes to the outcome. The 
overarching ambition is for the child to reach adulthood fully equipped to make autonomous 
choices for herself (Eekelaar, 1994, 48). 
For assistance in determining the extent to which a child should be viewed as legally 
competent to make autonomous decisions, Eekelaar (1994, 50) looked to the understanding of 
autonomy elaborated by Joseph Raz (1986, 369) in his monograph The Morality of Freedom. 
In Raz’s theory, first, an autonomous decision is viewed as one wherein the desires chosen to 
be followed are (intentionally) consistent with the individual’s ultimate goals. The goals in 
which these desires are realised must be achievable within attainable social forms. Finally, a 
decision may be autonomous even if inconsistent with the decision maker’s self-interest 
(Eekelaar, 1994, 55-56).  
 Eekelaar was cognisant that applying this definition to decisions made by children 
would not always be straightforward. The requirement that a decision be reconcilable with the 
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individual’s life goals might be hard to assess for children, since the child’s personality or 
identity might not yet be fully formed. As a solution, Eekelaar (1994, 55) suggested that we 
may say a decision is not autonomous if it reflects a feeling or aspiration which is so seriously 
unstable, or where there is such a grave disjunction between it and others held by the child, that 
to give effect to the decision risks serious conflicts within the individual at a later stage of 
development. For example, a five-year-old child may wish to exist on a diet of chips and 
chocolate, but may also wish to be sufficiently nourished to play with her friends, grow tall, 
and become a champion athlete in adult life. To accept the child’s decision on her diet would 
conflict so gravely with her other ambitions that it could not be considered an exercise of 
autonomy. The social form requirement provides a safeguard that is easier to apply. Children’s 
decisions may be considered non-autonomous because whatever goal they aspire to may simply 
be unrealistic, at least at present. Assessing the probability of an outcome may be beyond the 
cognitive capacity of a child at that point (Eekelaar, 1994, 55). For example, a child may wish 
to live in an ice palace with an animate snowman for companionship, but the prospect of 
achieving such an ambition must be vanishingly small.  
Eekelaar’s desire to marry protection of welfare and promotion of autonomy within a 
single justification for children’s rights is not unique amongst academic commentators. 
Michael Freeman (1983) developed a typology with similar ambitions, which he described as 
‘liberal paternalism.’ Here, the interests of children are divided into four categories – the right 
to welfare, the right of protection, the right to be treated like adults and rights against parents 
– which broadly cover the same ground as the three interests in Eekelaar's model (Freeman, 
1983, 57). Freeman also recognised the need for balance between protection of welfare and 
promotion of autonomy.  
 
The question we should ask ourselves is: what sort of action or conduct would we wish, 
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as children, to be shielded against on the assumption that we would want to mature to 
a rationally autonomous adulthood and be capable of deciding on our own system of 
ends as free and rational beings? We would choose principles that would enable 
children to mature to independent adulthood. One definition of irrationality would be 
such as to preclude action and conduct which would frustrate such a goal. (Freeman, 
1983, 57).  
 
Joel Anderson and Rutger Claassen (2012) conceptualised the issue somewhat 
differently in their exploration of a ‘regime of childhood’ which recognised that the status of 
being a child plays out within a certain set of rules. They explain a regime as being a normative 
status, constituted by institutionally and culturally backed understandings of what this status 
licenses bearers of the status to do, and obligations and prohibitions it places on others. Their 
focus is on four distinct but interlocking aspects of the modern regime of childhood, namely: 
(i) an orientation towards autonomy development; (ii) limited liability for children; (iii) 
parental supervisory responsibilities and (iv) age-based demarcation (Anderson & Classen, 
2012, 508-512). When determining the appropriate limits to be placed on individuals 
participating in certain activities based on age, the question to ask is what scheme of 
supervisory responsibility on the part of parents and what duration of the period of childhood 
tutelage best serves to realise the fundamental interest in autonomy development? (Anderson 
& Classen, 2012, 511). They describe situations in which individual children may be exempted 
from a general prohibition on making autonomous decisions prior to the age of majority, for 
example in relation to medical treatment, as examples of ‘local emancipation’(Anderson & 
Classen, 2012, 512). In determining whether such emancipation should be allowed, they 
suggest it is necessary to consider the current and future welfare of the child, and the current 
and future agency interests of the child (Anderson & Classen, 2012, 512-513).  
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Other models offering a synthesis of protection of interests and promotion of autonomy 
could no doubt be proposed. In the context of the discussion in this chapter, however, I have 
preferred Eekelaar's approach, not only because it is arguably the most influential within 
discussion of children's rights in the UK, but also because it offers the most useful insights into 
the right to belief and its relationship to the practice of collective worship. It is to that discussion 
that the chapter will now turn.     
 
The child’s right to belief and dynamic self-determinism 
 
In Eekelaar’s model, children’s rights in general are designed to protect their basic, 
developmental and autonomy interests. In this part of the chapter, that general outline will be 
applied in relation to the specific example of the child’s right to belief. What basic, 
developmental and autonomy interests can we identify within this right?  
The first step in answering this question is to define what is meant by ‘the child’s right 
to belief’. It is not possible to find a definition by simple reference to one international treaty 
or piece of domestic legislation. Children’s rights are contained within a number of overlapping 
instruments which vary in their content, their jurisdictional extent and their enforcement 
mechanisms. Additionally, rights designed to protect the interests of the child at this complex 
intersection of belief, education and family life may be held by the child’s parents rather than 
the child herself, in recognition of the age-related limitations on the child’s capacity to enforce 
her own rights. The detail of the various rights and freedoms accorded in relation to children’s 
beliefs is set out in full in chapter X, and I will not rehearse that material again here. However, 
a short summary of the key protections is necessary before Eekelaar’s basic, developmental 
and autonomy interests can be identified. 
As a general point, it is helpful to clarify that the rights of the child in relation to belief 
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are not confined to religious belief in a strict sense. Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights provides for freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The European Court 
of Human Rights has understood this to cover, in essence, all spiritual and philosophical 
convictions (Kokkinakis, 1993), including atheism (Angelini, 1986), pacifism (Arrowsmith, 
1978), veganism (W, 1993) and political value systems such as communism (Hazar, 1991). 
The same approach was adopted in the United Kingdom by the House of Lords (R (Williamson), 
2005, especially Lord Nicholls at [15] and Lord Walker at [55]). Accordingly, the right of the 
child under discussion here is not necessarily a right to adhere to a particular religion, but the 
right to identify with a system of values that allows her to understand the world and her place 
in it. That understanding may emerge partially or wholly through the child’s membership of a 
religious faith, but it may equally emerge through atheism or a non-theological set of 
philosophical convictions.       
Several specific rights can be enumerated in relation to children’s beliefs. In common 
with all human beings, the child has an absolute right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, together with a qualified right to manifest those beliefs, limited on various public 
interest grounds including public safety and protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
(ECHR, art 9; UNCRC, art 14). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
explicitly recognises the right of parents to be free from state interference in directing the child 
in the exercise of this right in line with her evolving capacities (UNCRC, art 14(2)) – a proviso 
not included in respect of other specific rights where a parent might be expected to offer 
direction, such as the rights to freedom of expression or freedom of assembly. The child also 
has a right to determination and preservation of her identity, including nationality, name and 
family relations (UNCRC, art 8 [right of the child to preserve her identity]; United Nations 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 1(1) [right to self-determination]; Mair, 
2015). Although belief is not specifically mentioned in the provisions related to identity, both 
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international and domestic legal instruments (UNCRC, art 20; United Nations Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 
art 5(4); Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 1(4)-(5); Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 
2007, s 14(4)(b)) do recognise that the child’s religious identity should be taken into account 
when, for example, she is to be adopted or otherwise separated from her birth family. Although 
a child has an independent right to education (ECHR, Protocol 1, art 2; UNCRC, art 28-30), 
the State must respect the right of parents to ensure that education is in conformity with the 
parents’ religious and philosophical convictions (ECHR, Protocol 1, art 2. This does not 
provide a positive right to have a child educated in accordance with parental beliefs at state 
expense, but a parent must have the ability to withdraw a child from teaching which conflicts 
with parental religious or philosophical convictions.)  
Identifying the interests of the child protected by these various belief rights is 
complicated by the fact that the rights often serve more than one master. This is so both in cases 
where the child holds a right directly, and where a right is held by the parent in respect of their 
child. Take, for example, the right of a parent to direct their child in the exercise of her right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. To some extent, this right can be seen to derive 
from the child’s interests. A young child has no capacity to guide the early formation of her 
values, but such values will inevitably form – even a toddler can understand basic moral ideas, 
like the fact it is generally wrong to hit others. It is in the interests of the child to be assisted in 
forming these values, which we might consider a type of intellectual and emotional nurture. 
The unarticulated assumption within the human rights instruments is that parents are the 
appropriate people to perform that role in the interests of the child. They are provided with the 
right to direct the child’s exercise of her right to belief to protect them, and in turn their child, 
from unjustified interference by a state that might seek to impose values of its own. However, 
this parental right does not derive solely from the child’s interests. Parents have an independent 
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interest which is also protected through this provision.1 As Rachel E Taylor notes:  
 
For devout parents, the proper religious upbringing of their children is often a core 
religious obligation of the parent themselves and a protected manifestation of the 
parent’s own right to religious freedom. (Taylor, 2015, 18).  
  
A further level of complexity may be added by the interests of specific religious communities. 
Anat Solnicov notes that parental rights in respect of religious education were not initially 
based on the interests of either the parent or the child, but intended rather for protection and 
preservation of religious minorities, by helping to ensure their continued existence into the next 
generation (Solnicov, 2007, 10).  
A further difficulty with identifying the interests of the child protected by the various 
belief rights is that the interests protected by the right to religious freedom for adults can be 
disputed. The primary justification relied upon in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights is the promotion of autonomy. In the leading decision of Kokkinakis v Greece, 
the court found: 
 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a ‘democratic 
society’ within the meaning of the Convention.  It is, in its religious dimension, one of 
the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception 
of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. 
The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over 
the centuries, depends on it. (Kokkinakis, 1994, at [31]).  
                                                 
1 It should be kept in mind, however, that this parental right under ECHR, article 9 to manifest religious belief is 
relative, and can be limited where necessary, amongst other things, to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
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Support for autonomy as the relevant normative value can also be found in the academic 
literature (Evans, 2001; Laycock, 1996). However, doubt has been cast on whether autonomy 
can provide a complete explanation for the full range of activities protected by this right 
(Ahmed, 2017), and competing justifications, such as liberty of conscience, have also been put 
forward (Koppelman, 2009; Nussbaum, 2008). 
For children, the argument that the interests protected by belief rights must include more 
than simply the promotion of autonomy is of particular relevance. This is, of course, because 
children are not autonomous for much of their childhood. This reality does not render autonomy 
irrelevant as an interest during childhood (LaFolette, 1989) – all children have an interest in 
developing the capacity for autonomy, and some children (‘mature minors’, discussed further 
below) will be capable of autonomous decision-making in relation to belief prior to reaching 
the age of majority. Sylvie Langlaude argues, however, that to focus solely on the autonomy 
aspects of the child’s right to belief is to misunderstand the important family and community 
interests which are also protected by this right (Langlaude, 2008, 494-497). Children brought 
up within a system of values are nurtured by families and communities that care about the 
transmission of those values. The interest of the child, in her view, is ‘to grow up as a religious 
being and to be nurtured into a religious faith by parents and religious community’ (Langlaude, 
2008, 477). Since the right to belief protects all systems of values, religious and non-religious, 
this assertion can perhaps be opened out. The interest of the child is to be nurtured in her 
development as a moral or philosophical person, regardless of whether that system of values is 
theologically based. 
How, then, does this complex web of rights around children’s beliefs map onto 
Eekelaar’s dynamic self-determinism model? In the first place, I would argue that the child has 
a basic interest in the initial formation of her religious or philosophical identity. Since it is not 
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possible to avoid forming an identity of some kind, protection and nurturing of this aspect of 
her identity may be considered to fall within Eekelaar’s category of emotional needs, best 
fulfilled by her parents or caregivers (Eekelaar, 1986, 170). Conceptualising the child’s basic 
interest in this way is coherent with the rights of the child herself, and with the legal rights of 
parents in respect of their children in this context: parents have a right and responsibility in 
respect of her religious or philosophical nurture just as they would do in respect of her physical 
and emotional nurture. 
Secondly, I would assert that the child’s developmental interest might best be summed 
up, to paraphrase Eekelaar’s terms, as the opportunity to have her capacity for religious and 
philosophical thought and action developed to its best advantage (Eekelaar, 1986, 170). This 
includes the development of the capacity for autonomous religious and philosophical thought 
and action. As an essentially educational interest, it might be expected that both the child’s 
parents and the state would play a role here. Again, this conceptualisation is consistent with 
the international rights framework described above.  
Finally, I would argue that the child’s autonomy interest requires that she has the 
maximum freedom possible to make her own choices in terms of her religious and 
philosophical beliefs. It is worth reiterating at this point that the dynamic self-determinism 
model posits these interests as a hierarchy, meaning that the child’s freedom of choice in 
relation to belief must be subordinated to her developmental and basic interests where they 
would otherwise be harmed. However, where the exercise of a child’s autonomy would not be 
harmful, her interest in doing so should be respected by both her parents and the state (Eekelaar, 
1986, 171). Additionally, where a child’s capacity for religious and philosophical thought has 
been developed to the level of maturity of a competent adult, in Eekelaar’s model, there can be 
no basis on which to argue that she should be prevented from exercising that autonomy 
(Eekelaar, 1994, 47-48). When a child reaches this stage, the role of the state may be most 
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accurately characterised as protecting her interests from interference by her parents.  
 
The dynamic self-determinist right to belief and the role of collective worship 
 
In the second part of the paper, I set out the basic, developmental and autonomy interests 
that are, in my analysis, served by the child’s right to belief. In this section of the paper, I 
analyse how the practice of school collective worship does or could contribute to the protection 
or promotion of these interests. In short, I argue that collective worship can play a role in 
fulfilling aspects of the child’s developmental and autonomy interests in relation to the 
formation and exercise of a personally meaningful system of religious or philosophical beliefs. 
However, reforms to current practice are needed before collective worship can play that role 
effectively. Specific recommendations for reform are included within my concluding section.  
My focus is on the developmental and autonomy interests served by the right to belief. 
By the time the child reaches school age and takes part in collective worship for the first time, 
around the age of five or six, she will already have a basic understanding of the world and her 
place in it. This may include understanding of a supreme being, or an alternative philosophical 
take, but the roots of some system of values – an ability to tell ‘right’ from ‘wrong’, perhaps – 
will be present. I would assert, then, that collective worship has no real role to play in fulfilling 
the child’s basic interest here. Once at school, the developmental interest of the child comes to 
the forefront. Just as the academic elements of school are intended to develop the child’s 
intellectual capacity, I would argue that collective worship is one mechanism for developing 
the child’s capacity for religious or philosophical thought. Finally, collective worship can be 
seen as having two roles in relation to the autonomy interest. First, it should assist the child in 
becoming an autonomous actor in matters of religious and philosophical belief. Second, it 
should respect her existing autonomy where it is possible to do so without harming her 
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developmental interest. 
In this section, the role of collective worship in relation to the child’s developmental 
and autonomy interests in religious or philosophical belief will be considered.         
 
The Developmental Interest 
How can collective worship contribute to the child’s developmental interest in the 
right to belief? 
This question is at the heart of much of the debate around the place of religion in the 
context of education. In terms of academic education, there is basic consensus within society 
about the type of adult we want the school system to help develop – an adult who has key 
literacy and numeracy skills, for example. In terms of religious or philosophical belief, however, 
the nature of any consensus is unclear. 
Eekelaar's model helps to define the parameters within which consensus must be 
achieved. He argues that the developmental interest of a child demands that she be placed in 
an environment which is reasonably secure, but which exposes her to a wide range of interests, 
with the aim of her becoming a good ‘chooser. (Eekelaar, 1994, 47-48). Liberal philosophy 
tends to the argument that, in the context of belief, development towards autonomy demands 
that the child be furnished with the ability to reflect critically on the beliefs with which they 
were raised, alongside exposure to other modes of belief or ways of understanding the world 
(Arneson & Shapiro, 1996; Macleod, 1997). An alternative argument can be made that this 
approach to development of autonomy during childhood actually results in closing off certain 
choices. Devotion and constancy towards one system of values in the formative period of our 
lives can provide the option of a form of adult religious life that is not otherwise possible, in 
the same way that dedication to the practice of a sport or musical instrument during childhood 
can provide the option of elite performance in adulthood which is otherwise virtually 
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impossible (Callan, 2002, 134-135). In this conceptualisation, development of the capacity for 
autonomous revision of inherited beliefs should be subordinated to the opportunity to develop 
the devotion which will allow for autonomous adherence to a belief system in adult life (Callan, 
2002, 137-139).  
Reasonable people may well disagree about the form of capacity for autonomy that 
should be preferred in relation to belief, in much the same way as they may disagree about the 
developmental goals of our school system in relation to other types of capacity. These 
disagreements are socio-political and cannot be resolved by law. What is needed is a statement 
of governmental policy which makes clear the ambitions underlying collective worship in the 
UK. Do we, as a society, seek to develop adults with the capacity for autonomous revision, or 
the capacity for autonomous adherence? Are there other aspects of this capacity we seek to 
develop?  
Any such policy must, however, adhere to the limitations placed on it by our human 
rights obligations. As discussed in more detail at chapter X above, the European Court of 
Human Rights has broadly taken the view that, in a society with a plurality of religious and 
philosophical beliefs such as the United Kingdom, the state may choose to provide faith schools 
in line with parental demand, but is not under an obligation to provide a school of any particular 
religious or philosophical character (X, 1978; followed in the UK courts by R (on the 
application of K), 2002; R (on the application of R), 2006). Outwith the faith school sector, the 
Court has tended increasingly to the view that the state’s duty of neutrality requires education 
to be secular. Aspects of education which could be considered to have a proselytising or 
indoctrinating effect, such as participation in religious activities, run counter to this duty in the 
eyes of the court (Lautsi, 2012). An accommodationist model, by which children (or their 
parents on their behalf) may opt out of activities which do not accord with their beliefs, has 
been accepted by the court as an appropriate mechanism for respecting the religious rights of 
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all parties in a school where various belief systems are represented (Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen 
and Pedersen, 1979-80; Folgero, 2008; Zengin, 2008; McCarthy, 2011), although difficulties 
arise where confessional religious aspects of education cannot easily be separated out from the 
remainder of the curriculum (Folgero, 2008). The jurisprudence here, in particular the extent 
to which secularism is equated with neutrality, is not uncontroversial (Leigh and Adar, 2012; 
Kyritsis and Tsakyrakis, 2013; Neha, 2013). It does, however, represent the current position on 
interpretation of human rights in this context. 
Taking the previous paragraphs together, two models of rights-compliant collective 
worship which serve the developmental interest present themselves. First, for advocates of the 
autonomous adherence approach, confessional religious worship in a particular faith would 
fulfil the child’s developmental interest without contravening human rights requirements, 
provided that all children in the school shared the same faith. Alternatively, for advocates of 
the autonomous revision approach, a non-confessional, secular practice of philosophical belief 
would again meet the child’s developmental interest without contravening human rights, on 
the assumption that the beliefs of a religious child are not disrespected by participation in non-
confessional activities. (As Leigh and Adar (2012) note, this assumption may not be correct in 
all cases.) A model that is arguably ruled out, however, is an accommodationist approach to 
collective worship, whereby a child whose beliefs do not allow her to participate in 
confessional activities simply opts out. This model may be appropriate by the time the child 
has sufficient capacity to make an autonomous decision on participation in worship – in other 
words, once the child is a mature minor whose developmental interest, at least in so far as belief 
is concerned, has been fulfilled – which I will return to below. For a less mature child, however, 
the difficulty is that her developmental interest is neglected if she simply opts out of the 
activities designed to improve her capacity for religious or philosophical thought, assuming 
that a meaningful alternative is not provided (Mawhinney, 2006).  
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Does the current practice of collective worship serve the child’s developmental 
interest? 
To what extent does law and practice in UK schools match up with the models of 
collective worship outlined above? In faith schools throughout the UK, where collective 
worship takes the form of confessional practice in line with the religious character of the school, 
the child’s developmental interest is arguably satisfied on the autonomous adherence model.  
In relation to non-faith schools, the position varies across the three jurisdictions. 
Scotland may come closest to realising a non-confessional model of development of the 
capacity for autonomous revision. Scottish Governmental policy guidance makes explicit that 
the overall goal of religious observance is to ensure that every child ‘reaches his or her potential’ 
through personal search that allows her to develop her own values (Scottish Executive, 2004). 
It is explicitly noted that non-denominational schools must support the development of children 
of all faiths or none through religious observance, with the suggestion that 'time for reflection' 
may be a more apposite title for the practice (Scottish Government, 2011, para 10). As 
discussed in chapter X above, however, it is not always clear that this guidance is followed in 
practice, where schools may tend to fall back on primarily Christian activities.  
In both England and Wales, schools without a religious character are under a statutory 
obligation to provide acts of worship 'of a broadly Christian character' (School Standards and 
Framework Act 1998, s.70 and sched 20, para 3(2) and 3(3)), with policy guidance elaborating 
that acts of worship 'must contain some elements which relate specifically to the traditions of 
Christian belief and which accord a special status to Jesus Christ' (for England, see Department 
for Education, 1994, para 62; for Wales, see Welsh Office Education Department, 1994, para 
65). As discussed in chapter X above, the policy guidance as to the purpose of including 
collective worship within the school day is inconsistent and contradictory. It is difficult to see 
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how this can appropriately fulfil the child’s interest in development of her religious or 
philosophical capabilities on either the adherence or revision model, other than, perhaps, where 
a child has been raised as a member of the relevant Christian faith. The position in Northern 
Ireland is perhaps even more confused since the legal provisions on collective worship and 
guidance on its implementation in practice have been elided with the provisions and guidance 
on religious education (Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986, art 21(1)). 
What it clear from chapter X above, however, is that worship is intended to be both Christian 
and confessional, which again suggests that the development interest is not being satisfied at 
least for non-Christian children.  
In summary, the current provision of collective worship in the UK outside of the faith 
school sector does not, as a general rule, serve the child’s developmental interest in relation to 
belief, where development is understood, as in Eekelaar's terms, to have the goal of producing 
an autonomous adult. To remedy the issues here, what is needed in the first place is a clear 
statement of the policy goal collective worship seeks to serve – for example, whether the school 
system aims to produce adults capable of autonomous adherence or autonomous revision. Only 
then can meaningful consideration be given to moulding the practice of worship in line with 
these goals and in compliance with international human rights obligations.     
 
The Autonomy Interest 
How should collective worship respect the child’s autonomy interest in relation to 
belief? 
In the previous section, I discussed the role of collective worship in developing the 
child’s capacity for belief, including the development of autonomy in relation to belief. Once 
a child’s capacity has been sufficiently developed – that is to say, once the child’s capacity for 
autonomous decision-making on belief is equivalent to that of an adult – the child’s 
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developmental interest can no longer be harmed. At this stage, when the child becomes a 
‘mature minor’, respect for the child’s autonomy interest demands that she be entitled to 
withdraw from participation in worship where it conflicts with her independently determined 
religious or philosophical beliefs.  
In the United Kingdom, the general rule is that individuals are viewed as autonomous 
actors on reaching the age of majority. However, in recent times the law has begun to recognise 
that children may also have the capacity for autonomous decision making in certain contexts, 
with the age at which such capacity is obtained varying from child to child. The leading 
authority for this concept is Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1985). 
The case arose when Victoria Gillick applied to the English courts for a determination as to 
whether a notice issued by the Department of Health and Social Security was lawful. The notice 
advised doctors that when persons under sixteen sought contraceptive advice and treatment, it 
was desirable for their parents to be consulted; however, in exceptional circumstances, a doctor 
might treat such a child alone so long as she did so in good faith and with regard to the child’s 
best interests. Mrs Gillick argued that a child under sixteen had no common law right to consent 
to treatment. The only person competent to consent was the child’s parent or guardian by virtue 
of their parental rights. Accordingly, she argued that a doctor would be acting illegally if he 
treated a child without the consent of her parent or guardian. 
By a narrow margin, the House of Lords disagreed with Mrs Gillick. It was held that 
children under sixteen could consent to receiving medical treatment, including contraceptive 
treatment, provided they had reached a certain degree of maturity and understanding. The exact 
criteria for such ‘Gillick-competence’ did not emerge clearly from the judgment. Lord Scarman 
expressed the view that, that for a child to be competent, she should understand the nature of 
the medical treatment and have sufficient maturity to understand what was involved, including 
moral and family questions and the risks to health and emotional stability. Lord Fraser, on the 
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other hand, emphasised that along with other factors, a doctor should only regard a child as 
competent if the treatment requested was in that child’s best interests. The difference in these 
two approaches has the result that Gillick cannot be said to have unambiguously recognised the 
autonomy of the child in law (Eekelaar, 1986b; Bainham, 1988; Gilmore, 2009; Fortin, 2011), 
but as has been noted, it ‘undeniably placed the idea of children’s autonomy rights in the legal 
consciousness in a way that had not previously existed’ (Gilmore, Herring and Probert, 2009, 
6). 
Subsequent legal developments have varied in the different UK jurisdictions. In 
Scotland, the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 gave specific statutory recognition 
to the autonomous capacity of children in relation to writing a will (s 2(2)), instructing a 
solicitor (s 2(4A)) and consenting to medical treatment (s 2(4)), amongst other things. This 
exceptional capacity is usually presumed to arise at age twelve, but in the case of medical 
treatment, it arises when the child is assessed by the practitioner as capable of understanding 
the nature and possible consequences of the treatment.2 There is no requirement for treatment 
to be in the child’s best interests: the Scottish Law Commission, after extensive consultation 
on this point, came to the conclusion that if a child was deemed to have sufficient maturity then 
it should not matter if the treatment was for her benefit or not (Scottish Law Commission, 1987, 
3.61-3.77). In the sole Scottish authority commenting on the issue, Houston, Applicant (1996), 
the sheriff was satisfied that a mother could not give consent to medical treatment of her fifteen-
year-old son, who had been assessed as capable of understanding the decision and had clearly 
                                                 
2  The section reads: A person under the age of sixteen shall have legal capacity to consent 
on his own behalf to any surgical, medical or dental procedure or treatment where, in the 
opinion of a qualified medical practitioner attending him, he is capable of understanding 
the nature and possible consequences of the procedure or treatment. 
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refused treatment. The decision in the case did not turn on this issue, however, meaning the 
views of the court have less force than they might have had. Scottish academic commentators 
tend to the view that the right to consent carries with it the right to refuse (Edwards, 1993; 
Elliston, 2007, 112) and current National Health Service guidance to medical professionals in 
Scotland recommends that where a competent person under sixteen refuses treatment, the 
refusal must be respected (Scottish Executive Health Dept, 2006, ch 2).    
In England and Wales, recognition of the potential autonomy of children has been more 
restricted. R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health (2006) confirmed that the law in Gillick 
should also apply in relation to abortion, but found that treatment without parental consent 
requires a high level of understanding on the part of the child along with being in the best 
interests of the child. In Re R (A Minor) (1991), Lord Donaldson suggested that a mature minor 
and her parent were both ‘keyholders’ to consent, and either might use her key regardless of 
the position of the other. This view was reiterated in Re W (1992). Accordingly, although both 
a child and her parent may have the right to consent, it seems only a parent has the right to 
refuse treatment on her child’s behalf. It is worth noting, however, that children under sixteen 
are given a specific statutory right to refuse medical procedures ordered by the court in relation 
to a child protection order (Children Act 1989, s 44(7)), in addition to a more general right to 
have their views heard when the court is taking decisions in relation to their upbringing 
(Children Act 1989, s 1(3)(a)). Although less developed than in Scotland, then, the concept of 
autonomy for the child nevertheless has a hold in English and Welsh law. 
In Northern Ireland, the position is similar to that of England and Wales. Although the 
decision in Gillick is nor directly applicable, there is no reason to think that it would not be 
followed there. It is not clear how subsequent decisions such as Re R would be viewed.  
Children under sixteen are again given a specific statutory right to refuse medical procedures 
ordered by the court in relation to a child protection order (Children (Northern Ireland) Order 
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1995/755, art 62(8)), and have a right to be heard in relation to decisions affecting their 
upbringing (Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995/755, art 3(3)(a)).   
Although recognition of the autonomy of the child within the UK jurisdictions remains 
restricted, I would argue that the existing precedents support the requirement of respect for the 
child’s autonomy in relation to collective worship. The position in relation to medical decisions 
is particularly salient. In this area, two significant, related concerns animate constraints on the 
exercise of autonomy. First, the consequences of a child’s decision can be extremely serious. 
Refusal of medical treatment may result in death. By contrast, refusal to participate in collective 
worship cannot cause harm where the child’s developmental interest is already fulfilled, and 
even if a child who was not sufficiently mature was in error permitted to excuse herself from 
worship, the harm caused would be limited. In the second place, decisions taken in the medical 
context may be irreversible. Even where the outcome of a medical decision is less dramatic 
than death, it may still represent a door being closed on a line of treatment that was only 
available at a particular time or in particular circumstances, for example if a child were to refuse 
an organ transplant. By contrast, refusal to participate in worship at one time by no means 
precludes a change of heart at a later time. The nature of religious or philosophical identity is 
that it evolves over the course of a lifetime. At least in the UK, it is common to hear of adults 
leaving and returning to faiths at different life stages. The decision taken by a child here is far 
from determinative or irreversible. In fact, the opportunity to visit and revisit beliefs is an 
integral aspect of autonomous adult life. 
In assessing whether a child has reached the level of maturity required to allow her to 
make an autonomous decision on participation in worship, some guidance can be gleaned from 
current practice in the courts. Throughout the UK, children have the right to be heard in court 
proceedings where the outcome will have an effect on their lives, with the most common 
examples being residence and contact disputes (Children Act 1989, s 1(3)(a) (England and 
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Wales); Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s11(7)(b); Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995/755, 
art 3(3)(a)). The court will consider the child’s views subject to the child’s age and level of 
understanding. In Scotland, a presumption of maturity at age twelve is contained in statute 
(Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s11(10)). Research into the various mechanisms by which the 
child’s capacity is assessed and her views recorded (Parkinson and Cashmore, 2008, ch 4; 
Barnes, 2008; Barnes, 2008b; Raitt, 2007; Kay, Tisdall et al, 2004) tends to suggest that, for 
most children, the best approach is through face-to-face conversation with the person who will 
make the decision on her capacity, preferably in a neutral venue (Barnes, 2008, 141). The 
purpose of the conversation should be made clear to the child, and all children should be treated 
in the same way (Barnes, 2008, 140). Decision-makers should be given appropriate training on 
working with children and assessing their maturity relevant to the particular context (Raitt, 
2007, 218). It seems reasonable to suggest that a teacher tasked with assessing the maturity of 
a child in order to determine whether the child has sufficient maturity to opt out of collective 
worship is in a stronger position than a judge or other professional making such assessments in 
court: teachers have extensive training in dealing with children and may have had the 
opportunity to come to know the child in question fairly well over several years of school. 
Against that background, there seems no reason to doubt that a teacher would be capable of 
making an assessment of the child’s maturity in this context.   
 
Does the current practice of collective worship respect the child’s autonomy 
interest? 
I argued in the preceding section that, where a child is sufficiently mature to make her 
own decisions on matters of religious or philosophical belief, respect for her autonomy interest 
demands that she be entitled to opt out of worship where it conflicts with her values. Support 
for the argument that an opt- out is necessary to meet our international obligations in terms of 
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the child’s right to belief can be found in the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child’s Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom, 
published in July 2016. To what extent is an opt-out already available in the various UK 
jurisdictions? 
The position varies. Scotland, in contrast with its approach in relation to medical 
treatment, offers the child no real autonomy here. Parents have the right to withdraw their 
children from religious observance (Education (Scotland) Act, s 9), but the child has no 
independent entitlement to do so (McCarthy, 2017). The position is the same in Northern 
Ireland, where parents can withdraw their children ‘on grounds of conscience’ (Education and 
Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986, art 21(5)). Parents in England and Wales may also 
withdraw their children from collective worship, in addition to which, sixth-form children in 
these jurisdictions have an independent entitlement to do so without the need for parental 
agreement (School Standards and Framework Act 1988, s 71).  
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
 
My intention in this chapter was to offer a novel understanding of the role of collective 
worship by using Eekelaar's model of dynamic self-determinism as a mechanism for breaking 
down the different elements of the child's right to belief. I have argued that collective worship, 
or at least some form or religious or philosophical practice, may make a valid and important 
contribution to the development of a child's capacity for autonomous religious and 
philosophical belief. However, reform of current law and practice is necessary to ensure that 
collective worship does so in a way that protects the child's developmental and autonomy 
interests to the maximum extent possible whilst also adhering to international human rights 
standards. 
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In the first place, I consider it critical for a clear governmental policy to be articulated 
as to the type of religious or philosophical capacity we, as a society, seek to develop in our 
children. This will be no easy task. However, it is clear that the historical reasons for the 
practice of collective worship have become outdated and without clear guidance on what we, 
as a society, consider the child's developmental interest to be here, it is not possible to ensure 
that interest is being met.  
With that policy statement in place, I argue that the practice of worship should be 
revised to meet those policy ambitions within the human rights framework. At present, the 
primarily Christian practice of worship in non-faith schools does not appear to support the 
development of autonomy on either the adherence or revision models, in addition to which it 
contravenes the European Court of Human Rights guidance on neutrality in the classroom. 
These difficulties are not insurmountable, and Clare's Cassidy's discussion of philosophy with 
children in chapter X offers a useful starting point for consideration of models of collective 
worship (or 'time for reflection') which might meet these tests.    
Finally, where the practice of worship contradicts the values of a Gillick-competent 
child, I have argued that respect for the child's autonomy interest in relation to belief demands 
that an opt-out be made available to her. A right to withdraw here would not impact on the 
child's developmental interest, since for a Gillick-competent child, this interest has already 
been met. It is worth noting, however, that an inclusive model of worship, such as the practice 
of philosophy suggested above, is likely to avoid the need for an opt-out to be exercised since 
the practice is unlikely to conflict with any child's particular beliefs. 
With these reforms in place, a clear answer can be given to the question posed at the 
start of this chapter. Collective worship (or time for reflection) will contribute to the fulfilment 
of the right to belief of every child within a religiously plural society.   
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